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Introduction 
 
One way to assess the success of economic transformation is to look at the share of 
resources the state still controls. One expects a decline of the state sector due to 
privatisation and increasing private transactions as measured by government expenditure 
or government revenue in relations to national income (overview in Mueller 1989: 320-347; 
Mueller and Murrell 1985). Indeed the state’s share of GDP in China declined form thirty 
one per cent in 1978, when reforms began, to a meagre eighteen per cent in 2002 
(Appendix Table 1). Yet economic transformation needs to be accompanied by a change in 
the means for extracting resources from the economy. Generally speaking there are four 
ways for a state to achieve this: First, compulsory state enforced transfer of income of 
economic agents via taxation; second, exploitation of state owned (controlled) property or 
resources; third, forced loans; and finally, “printing money”. Provided that a government is 
committed to macroeconomic stability as is evidently the case in China, economic 
transformation will be accompanied by major shifts in the first three extraction modes. 
Revenues from the operation of state controlled resources will decline due to privatisation, 
if not from shrinking profits of uncompetitive state firms; revenues from forced loans 
which in the socialist past took the form of compulsory transfers of the firms’ cash flows 
and compulsory saving of private economic agents will decline when and if the 
government no longer fixes prices and wages. In contrast, revenues from taxation, which 
had been almost non-existing in the socialist past will increase.  
 
This shift in state revenue generation points to the fact that transition economies need to 
establish a market conforming tax regime (an overview over the discussion on tax regimes 
and political or fiscal federalism in Russia can be found in Frye and Shleifer 1997; 
Hellman and Schankerman 2000; Litwack J. 2003; Inman and Rubinfeld 1998; Berkowitz 
and Li 2000; Gordon and Li 1997. The classical texts on fiscal federalism are Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; and Oates 1972). One way to do so is to emulate tax systems found in 
functioning market economies and incorporate the concomitant legal changes in the initial 
reform package. This happened in European transition economies. China took an 
alternative course. In the course of on-going financial reforms, the emergence of a new tax 
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system followed economic development and reflects the interplay between the state, i.e. 
central government and national legislation, other public authorities to which the task of 
tax extraction and collection was delegated, and (potential) tax payers. So far this interplay 
resulted in what is called de facto fiscal federalism, a term which stresses the fact that in 
China the federalist features in the multi-layered administrative system do not reflect the 
outcome of political reforms, but emerged as a side effect of financial reforms (Qian and 
Weingast 1997; Qian and Roland 1998; Qian et.al. 1999; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 
1995).  
 
The emergence of China’s tax regime has attracted surprisingly little attention. 
Descriptions can be found in the literature on “Central-local financial relations”, most 
prominently in studies published by the World Bank (Wong 1997; 2002; Ma 1995a; World 
Bank 1994; Bahl and Wallich 1992. See also Wong 1991; 1992; Ma 1995b; Oksenberg and 
Tong 1991; Chung 1995; Park et.al. 1996; Bahl 1998; Tsui and Wang 2002; Wong, Heady 
and Woo 1995). Severely hampered by the availability of data, these interpretations (with 
the notable exception of Wong 2002) stop at the provincial level. Such a procedure neglects 
revenue generation by public authorities below the provincial level, in China’s case at 
prefecture, districts, county and township level.  
 
Conceptually, such an analysis treats sub-provincial layers of government as a black box. 
Analytically, this would only be justified if all these government agencies were 
homogenous units under complete hierarchical control. Yet, field studies have 
overwhelmingly shown that sub-provincial government agencies have the discretionary 
means to pursue their own economic policy and often enough form alliances with the local 
business sector in order to minimise tax transfer to the national tax administration (For 
example Bai et. al. 2003; Bao et.al. 2002; Blanchard, and Shleifer 2000; Hsu 1999; Krug 
and Hendrischke 2003; Wedeman 2003; Wank 1996; 1999; Walder 1995; Brandt et.al. 
2002; Chen and Rozelle 1999; Goodman 2000). In the China-specific literature this gained 
prominence in form of the ‘Neo-corporatism’ hypothesis which claims that unlike Russia, 
where the old Leviathan hypothesis from the Public Choice literature re-appeared in the 
form of the “Grabbing Hand”-hypothesis (Krug and Zhu 2004; Frye and Shleifer 1997; 
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Shleifer and Vishny 1994; 1998), China is characterised by a “Helping Hand” (Oi 1992; 
1995; Unger and Chan 1995. See also Nee 2000). In China, an unspecified local state 
contributes to economic development via tax concessions, subsidisation and facilitation of 
investment and work place generation. Leaving aside the flaws of the Neo-corporatist 
hypothesis, what matters is the empirical fact that the emerging national tax system is 
burdened with a severe principal agent problem because central political authorities have 
lost the ability to control local government agencies to which responsibilities such as tax 
collection were delegated. Field studies have further shown that the economic environment 
differs not only from province to province but also from county to county. Modelling all 
sub-provincial government agencies as a black box therefore overlooks the information 
necessary for analysing the causes of the variance in ‘local’ economic policy. This 
procedure also disregards the effects that such a decentralised governmental system has on 
the functioning of markets and the resulting prospect for future economic transformation 
and development (Krug and Hendrischke 2003; Smyth and Inder 2004; Berkowitz and Li 
2000; Litwack 2003; Blanchard and Shleifer 2000). 
 
In short, in what follows it is claimed that first, the emergence of and changes in China’s 
tax system are crucial to understanding China’s transition process, and second, that any 
analysis of the tax system, its emergence, changes and functioning needs to take into 
consideration government agencies at central and provincial as well as prefecture, county 
and township level. 
 
In view of the lack of official statistical data, what follows is an attempt to provide an 
empirical base that will allow comparative analysis once in future more data can be 
collected from different local jurisdictions. The cases presented here offer the first insights 
in the working of taxation at the lowest level of government. Our presentation is based on 
extensive interviews with representatives of  township governments and local and national 
tax administration bureaus in two townships in the two provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
in June 2004. The interviews (and the organisation of data below) single out three aspects 
of the tax system: first, the reach of the state (government size), by questioning what can be 
learned by including township governments in the analysis; second, effective tax rates, 
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specifically how far data collected by national and local tax bureaus reflect the procedures 
for translating tax rules into effective tax rates; third, the functioning of intergovernmental 
transfer system of taxation and other revenues sources. These three aspects form part of the 
ultimate research agenda, which is to better understand the emergence of tax regimes in 
transition economies (aside from historical studies, the literature focuses on taxation in 
democratic environments, e.g. Winer and Hettich 2003, or on general transaction cost 
considerations, such as North 1984; Williamson 1985; Levi 1988; Stinchcombe 1990; 
Kiser 1994). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The institutional perspective shows the  changes in the tax 
system, concentrating on the definition of the tax base, the delineation of tax jurisdictions, 
and the design of tax administration. The description indicates that the tax regime is facing 
a yet unsolved principal agent problem. This problem is caused by a lack of institutions 
able to align the interests of national legislation (by central political authorities) with the 
interests of local agencies acting on behalf of sub-provincial governments (Section 2). A 
descriptive analysis of two township budgets underpins the under-institutionalisation 
assumption relating to the current tax regime [Section 3]. This raises questions with respect 
to the “reach of the state”, effective tax rates and intergovernmental transfer which are 
addressed in (Section 3). The paper concludes with some general remarks on the 
foundation of fiscal federalism and property rights (Section 5).  
 
The institutional perspective 
 
A description of the emerging tax regime in China faces problems such as differences in 
the classification of taxes, lack of information in particular about taxation at the 
sub-provincial level, and changes in taxation policy. These are caused on one hand by tax 
reforms in 1982, 1994, and 2001-03 (description in Tsang and Chen 1994; Lee 2000; Tung 
2003; Yep 2004), and on the other hand by the changing behaviour of partners in tax 
contracting. 
 
At the beginning of the reform the national treasury relied almost exclusively on (state) 
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firms as tax subjects, not on legally defined units (companies, corporations or individuals). 
Taxes aimed at extracting surplus and cash flow (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; 1998) while 
regulatory taxes supported planned allocation of goods and investment. The need to find 
alternative sources to aliment state budgets led to the tax registration of an expanding range 
of firms and the introduction of a European style consumption tax (VAT) with the major 
purpose of securing revenue for the national coffers. VAT, which replaced the many 
product taxes, broadened the tax base by making consumption taxable and turning 
consumers into tax payers. Personal income, wages, salaries, capital income and 
inheritance were all made taxable by 2002. Yet, by only taxing personal income above 800 
RMB per month, personal income taxes still affect only a small percentage of income 
earners and amount to no more than seven per cent of national tax revenue (see Table 2).  
 
The central government set up different national and local tax jurisdictions under its 
control, following the socialist administrative structure. Interested more in revenue and 
rate of growth, the central political leadership used devolution of regulatory power as an 
incentive to ensure that local government agencies would broaden the tax base and enforce 
tax legislation (Eckaus 2003, Tsui and Wang 2004, Wong 2002; Hsu 2004). The 
devolution of regulatory power left the central state with a serious principal-agency 
problem caused by the coexistence of two models of tax administration (Wong 2003; 
Chung 2001; Bean 1998a). Until today the emergence of a new tax regime in China 
depends as much on inter-governmental negotiation as on national legislation, let alone 
international ‘models’.  
 
Defining the tax base 
 
The beginning of market conforming taxation implied an expanding reach for the state 
beyond the inherited state sector (The summary of the institutional frame follows the 
thorough descriptions in Wong 2002; the different contribution in Bean 1998, Gordon and 
Li 1997; 1999; Nee 2000; IMF 1994; Wong, Heady and Woo 1995). Firms other than state 
firms (SOEs) still controlled by state ministries needed to be included in the tax base. In the 
case of China joint ventures, foreign companies, private firms and ‘township and village 
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enterprises’ (TVEs), and peasant households were defined as tax payers subject to direct 
and indirect taxation. It is worth mentioning that agricultural production is still regarded as 
a special case, for which the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible. In a further step in the 
nineties, the many product taxes were abolished and replaced by one consumption tax, 
VAT, (and one business tax) which was expected to deliver high revenue at low tax rates 
for the national coffers. In a third step, the reach of personal income tax was broadened to 
include tax on capital gains, transfer of assets, and inheritance (2001-2003).  
 
So far the Chinese tax regime is not too different from other countries. The China-specific 
features can be seen in the so-called extrabudgetary fees (and revenues), an inherited name 
which today describes what is taxed and how at the lower local government level. 
Reclassifying these fees is difficult so long as there are no clear indication which level of 
local government levies which fee, and procedures that forced local governments to report 
all fees (Wong 2002; Eckaus 2003; Holzer and Zhang 2004; Bean 1998; Gordon and Li 
1999). As field studies rather than aggregated statistics have proved (for examples see 
Wong 2002; Bernstein and Lü 2003; Cai 2003; West and Wong 1995; Hsu 1999; 2000; 
Chen and Rozelle 1999; Oi 1992) often enough there is no difference between taxation 
linked to sub-provincial government agencies by national legislation (as for example 
stipulated as ‘local taxes’ in Appendix, Table 3) and fees levied by local agencies 
legitimised by devolution of regulatory power. Thus, for example, some fees are surtaxes, 
others are a flat rate tax on output or a per capita (per firm registration) tax. Lacking 
uniform procedures means that the same fee can differ from one locality to the other with 
respect to its rate and base. What complicates the reading of the consolidated tax/revenue 
statistics even more, is that some fees are indeed user charges to be paid by consumers of 
locally provided infrastructure or services, such as roads, schools, sewages systems, 
electricity and other public utilities. 
 
In short, there are basically two tax systems in China. One is defined by national legislation 
which stipulates the tax base, tax rates, the procedure by which taxes are collected and 
compliance is monitored, and how total revenue is shared between the central budget and 
local budgets consolidated at the provincial level1. The second tax system is characterised 
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by provincial and sub-provincial discretion and tax contracting, ad hoc taxation, and 
unspecified procedures. As the following will show this dual tax system has major 
implications: First, the effective tax rate can be calculated only ex post when the exact local 
rates and fees are known. This makes, second, the local government agencies the ultimate 
authority in defining effective tax rates. Third, local government agencies facing different 
(financial) needs and/or different political leverage in tax contracting (see below) will 
differ in their revenue generating policy, subsequently contributing to the diversity in the 
local business environment within one province. Finally, the national treasury or central 
government has only limited ways of controlling overall taxation. Subsequent reforms over 
the past fifteen years, in particular the so-called ‘tax for fee’-programme have attempted to 
put an end to the practices of sub-provincial government agencies using (ad hoc) fees for 
balancing their budgets. Simultaneously, the reforms aim at limiting the overall tax burden 
for overcharged peasant households (Bernstein and Lü 2003) and producing effective and 
unified tax rates for firms. Yet, as will be argued in what follows these reforms can be of 
limited effect only so long as the basic problem, i.e. the co-existence of a national tax 
bureaucracy and tax contracting, is not solved 
 
There is an obvious link between tax authority and unsettled property rights in China. So 
long as local government agencies find their claim over local resources uncontested, they 
will charge user fees for all assets under their control. For local governments to relinquish 
the right to charge fees in return for the right to tax, depends on positive incentives as much 
as on monitoring of tax policies in different tax jurisdictions. Likewise, so long as local 
government agencies are acknowledged as residual claimants of ‘local’ taxes, any attempt 
to better enforce tax compliance via the tax administration misses the crucial incentive 
structure. 
 
Delineation of tax jurisdiction 
 
Under conventional forms of fiscal federalism, specific taxes are assigned to the exclusive 
use of different levels of governments. In contrast, Chinese fiscal federalism refers to 
revenue sharing between jurisdictions. Total tax revenue is shared by the different levels of 
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government and based on tax contracts which makes coordination via tax farming within 
one administrative hierarchy another constituent feature of Chinese fiscal federalism. This 
is not reflected in Chinese budget reports and tax statistics where all sub-provincial 
jurisdictions are summarised as local.  
 
Tax contracts describe the agreed upon share of tax revenue to be transferred to the 
superior level (or the national treasury) as well as the agreed upon provision of public 
services by the respective local government agencies. Tax contracts are a form of tax 
farming in which territorial units, such as provinces, prefectures, counties and townships 
negotiate tax volumes to be transferred upwards on behalf of the national government. The 
tax contract system reverses the order of the state bureaucracy by making the local level 
(the lessee) the residual claimant of tax revenue. Negotiations between different levels of 
local governments on transfer and retransfer of revenue became a constant feature of 
Chinese fiscal federalism. Government agencies at each level attempt to maximise 
discretionary revenue outside of the control of the superior unit, while shifting expenditure 
for public services downwards. Subsequently, effective tax rates do not reflect tax 
legislation; they are rather the outcome of inter-governmental contracting and transfer or 
reflect the innovativeness of sub-provincial government agencies in finding new revenue 
generating resources.  
 
Superior government agencies as the lessers of the tax contracts displayed risk-averse 
behaviour when they negotiated a lump sum or a minor percentage of growth rates. For this 
reason lower level governments (the tax contracts’ lessees) profited from high economic 
growth rates, and/or innovation rents generated in their jurisdictions. One response to this 
situation was the introduction of new national taxes, such as VAT. However, in order to 
ensure the compliance of sub-provincial government agencies, once more they were given 
a twenty five per cent entitlement of overall VAT revenue through the tax sharing system. 
Similar motivational devices can be found operating at various sub-provincial levels where 
specific sharing rates are negotiated for the several local taxes and fees A cautious 
interpretation of the scarce information about the interaction between province, prefecture, 
county and township suggests the following bargaining game. The tax contracts are about 
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tax volume that each level of government regards as necessary for fulfilling its tasks. In 
case the outcome of the bargaining leaves a specific tax jurisdiction short of official tax 
revenue, the respective local government will adjust tax bases, or tax rates; or mobilise new 
revenue generating sources. 
 
Thus, for example, more and more local government agencies comply with the tax for 
fee-programme by mobilising so-called ‘off-budget’ revenue. This term refers to the 
revenue local governments agencies appropriate by selling local resources, the most 
valuable of which is land, or by cashing in dividends from half-privatised incorporated 
companies.  
 
Tax administration 
 
The existence of two parallel tax systems is a characteristic feature of China that is not 
repeated in any other transition economy. The dual tax system find is correspondence in a 
dual tax administration.  
 
The Chinese mode of a decentralised financial administration (see Appendix, Figure 1) 
acknowledges the province as the central government’s major local partner in tax policy. 
The province is entitled to an annually revised share of total tax revenue from national tax 
revenue and from the lower government agencies as negotiated in contracts. With the 
provinces entitled to grant tax concessions or change tax rates and being in charge of tax 
collection this system comes close to a tax farming system (Bahl 1998, see also Kiser 
1994). This system leads to a situation in which local tax offices remain under dual 
subordination of the national tax administration on one side and the local government 
agencies on the other side. This system must create major agency and incentive problems. 
Unsurprisingly one reform addressed the incentive problem of the tax contracting system 
by assigning more exclusive taxes to the different layers of local government, by limiting 
the range of taxes with shared revenues, and last but not least by assigning ‘mandatory 
obligations’, tasks to the corresponding levels of government agencies. The reason was to 
limit opportunity and incentives for local government agencies to manipulate national 
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taxes in such a way as to minimise transfer to the national coffers (Tsui and Wang 2004; 
Wong 2002; Bernstein and Lü 2003). Simultaneously, the reforms addressed the principal 
agent problem by establishing an independent tax bureaucracy. The State Administration 
of Taxation (SAT) was separated from the Ministry of Finance in 1988, given full ministry 
status under the State Council in 1993, and put in charge of all tax policy. The new SAT 
established from 1994 onwards bureaus at each level of China’s government agencies in 
charge of the monitoring and collecting national and shared taxes down to county and 
township level. These hierarchically organised was expected to function independent from 
any interference by local government agencies.  
 
The creation of a new tax hierarchy needs to be interpreted as an attempt to solve the 
principal agent problem by establishing a Weberian kind of bureaucracy in which qualified 
professionals, on a fixed salary base, act on behalf of the “state”, in fact the central 
government, as the principal. The local government agencies in turn copied, if not 
duplicated this tax administration system for their ‘own’ taxes, namely those local taxes, 
surcharges, fees and tax concessions stipulated at the sub-provincial jurisdictions and/or 
negotiated in the tax contracts with firms or other tax payers. While nominally these local 
tax offices were under dual leadership by the SAT and local governments (see Appendix 
Figure 1), individual local governments exercised dominant control over them. The central 
SAT could only interfere with local tax administrations down to province level and only 
through recommendations or in an advisory function; for example, by commenting on 
appointments or offering operational advice. 2  
 
Within this structure, sub-provincial government agencies remain the de facto residual 
claimants for taxes and fees not covered under the tax sharing system with the central 
government. In other words, their control of and leadership over local tax offices enabled 
sub-provincial governments at various levels to maintain their residual tax rights over the 
informal tax system. This relatively strong bargaining position of local governments and 
the weak institutional position of the central government in enforcing unified procedures 
has resulted in a complex transfer and retransfer system between local government levels 
from township upwards to province level.  As there are not unified guidelines and because 
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of the informality of the processes involved, little has been written about this aspect of 
local taxation, even though it is perhaps the most important aspect for local enterprises.  
 
The Local Perspective  
 
The technalities of local accountancy 
 
To understand the often confusing use of terms it is important to distinguish between the 
authority to tax and the entitlement to (shares of) tax revenue at the different levels of 
government. Table 3 and 4 list all taxes based on national legislation, whose revenues are 
assigned to either the central  (guoshui) or local (dishui) level, or are shared between the 
two layers of government. In a second step the province decides whether and how to 
re-transfer tax revenue to the subordinate levels at the prefecture, county or township level. 
In contrast, taxes that are exclusively assigned to provincial and sub-provincial 
government agencies are so-called local taxes (dishui). As stated above, local government 
agencies are entitled by national legislation to levy surcharge taxes and fees, which despite 
their tax-character are not listed as local taxes, but usually reported as extrabudgetary 
revenue (EBR).  
 
From budget practices the categories look differently. Local budgets list as revenue (difang 
shouru) not only the local share of the mixed taxes, or local taxes, but also EBRs, and to 
some degree also further informal revenues sometimes called extra-system revenue 
(tizhiwai shouru) and translated as off-budget revenue (OBR); for a description see Wong 
1998; 2002; Eckaus 2003). The classification of EBRs follows the inherited administrative 
structure rather than information and monitoring needs of the tax state. Part of the EBRs, 
the so-called surcharges, are taxes, using the same income, consumption or profit tax base, 
as the original tax. Part of the fees are taxes on output using a flat tax rate, such as fees “in 
support of” (such as poverty relief, or construction), while other fees, such as the one for 
public security or the police are per capita taxes, or a tax on each registered firm. Finally 
part of the fees are user charges, which should not show up in the local budget as they are 
paid directly to the local provider of infrastructure, such as schools or public utilities. The 
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present round of tax reform with its ‘tax for fee’-programme intends to put an end to the 
mushrooming fees. Unlinked to economic performance, these fees offered an effective 
anti-cyclical financial tool, but could also lead to predatory charges. In particular in the 
countryside, such fees have the potential to unleash rural protest and violence (see the 
meticulous study by Bernstein and Lü 2003; also Tsui and Wang 2004. It is worth 
mentioning that in the most careful definition, EBRs accounted for 20 per cent of all 
revenues in 1982 and increased to over 50 per cent in 1996, see Eckaus (2003, Table 1, 74). 
OBRs refer basically to revenues from village-owned firms, such as TVEs, or proceeds 
from land sales. In short they are returns from the operation and exploitation of resources 
under control of the village (or other sub-provincial government agencies).  
 
The case: a comparison of two township budgets 
 
Legally speaking, provinces enjoy considerable discretionary power when it comes to 
distributing local tax revenue and devolving regulatory power to different levels of 
intra-provincial government agencies. The fact that this happens mostly through 
negotiations means at the same time that lower levels in the local government hierarchy 
have also considerable power to defend their interests. These features alone can explain a 
great part of the diversity of tax regimes at the lowest levels of local government. Another 
factor contributing to the diversity of sub-provincial budgets are the EBRs as defined and 
collected by lower government agencies, and the OBRs, i.e. returns from township owned 
industrial assets (TVEs) or land. Empirical studies have shown the spread of the latter two 
factors, albeit at the provincial consolidated level to be considerable, amounting to fifty per 
cent of consolidated local revenue (Eckhaus 2003, Table 5 and 9, 79 and 85). Finally, 
intergovernmental transfer between different levels of local government agencies are an 
additional dimension determining local revenue. The question remains what this means for 
the lowest level of local government, i.e. the township level. 
 
Not surprisingly, the two townships, M and L whose budgets are presented in Appendix 
Table 5 and Table 6, offer different pictures. A direct comparison between recent budgets 
of Township M and Township L documents the differences in both budgeting procedures 
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and revenues sources. As shown in Table 5, Township M lists budgetary revenue as well as 
EBR. EBR include user charges which should not be part of the township budget, subsidies 
and proceeds from land sales and capital income, i.e. interest rates. Township L lists 
different sub-items, such as budgetary revenue, budgetary fund revenue, earmarked fund 
revenue (equivalent a previous version of EBR) and other revenue. While this confirms 
Wong (2002, 64) that there is no standard procedure for reporting revenues, the two 
townships differ widely with respect to sources of revenues (see Appendix, Table 6).  
 
Township M depends much more on taxation (45.2 per cent of total financial revenue) than 
Township L (24.4 per cent). As the item ‘Other’ in the category of EBRs suggests, 
Township M seems to use fees (22.3 per cent of total revenue) charged by the providers of 
public utilities for ‘balancing’ the budget. Township L clearly is the more entrepreneurial 
township: extrabudgetary revenue adds up to not more than twelve per cent, while “off 
budget” revenue is sixty four per cent of total revenue. It is worth emphasizing that in this 
case returns from village-owned companies in form of dividends or profit transfer 
contribute ten per cent of total revenue. Proceeds from land sales, sales plus local tax on 
transaction, however, provide fifty per cent of total township income.  
 
Yet, we find also some common features between the two townships. Aside from the 
remarkable degree to which local budgets depend on entrepreneurial activities of resources 
that are still controlled or ‘owned’ by townships, both budgets list revenues re-transferred 
from superior administrative agencies. The retransfer depends on formulas, which are part 
of the fiscal contracts that define the effective sharing ratio. Total re-transfer refers to a 
fixed remittance linked to the township’s annual tax-task (70 per cent national coffers and 
30 per cent ‘local’) and a bonus based on excess tax revenue. Both townships receive 
additional subsidies from superior state agencies (see Table 5). In short, the township 
budgets depend on off-budget revenues plus intergovernmental transfer and retransfer of 
tax revenue.  
 
Intergovernmental transfer of taxes at the township level 
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Information about intergovernmental transfer of taxes is not published but needs to be 
generated by interviewing three to four groups of economic agents: representatives of the 
national and local tax administration, representatives of the local government, and firms. 
This fact alone indicates that tax revenue transfer does not follow standardised procedures. 
To the contrary, as will be shown in what follows, the transfers cannot be standardised so 
long as the intergovernmental transfer is used as a tool to align the interests of the state tax 
bureaucracy insisting on compliance with rules and the interests of local state government 
agencies as lessees in tax contracts insisting on their right to negotiate volume of retained 
tax revenue. The interviews allow singling out four specific features that characterise 
transfer practice at the township level. 
 
(1) Tax revenue is not simply transferred to the next superior administrative level. 
Instead townships share tax revenue with four different levels, namely the centre, the 
province (via the guoshui tax), the prefecture and the county. This is the case for 
Jiangsu Province, while in Zhejiang Province the prefectural level could be bypassed. 
Interaction between these different levels of government agencies is partly statutory, 
i.e. based on legislation, and partly resulting from preceding negotiations. Tax items 
that follow statutory sharing formulas are “fixed shares” of local and national taxes, 
plus “bonus” when actual transfer exceeds the ex ante agreed upon transfer (see 
below), “expenditure [overhead] for the financial departments”, a rather unspecified 
“remittance to the prefectural level” (in the case of M Township) and “earmarked 
subsidies from superior levels”.  
(2) Statistics reporting figures from the national tax administration offer a misleading 
picture. They overestimate the central government’s share (60 per cent in Table 7) 
because they are not adjusted for tax refunds (see below). Tax statistics also do not 
provide information on how tax revenue is shared between the different layers of 
local government agencies, let alone between local government and firms (see Table 
8). In the case of M Township the actual split between national (central) and local tax 
revenue for the first half of 2003 looks as follows: 
 
Table 7: Total Tax Revenue collected by M Township, Jan.-Jun. 2003 
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(RMB) 
Item Actual amount Per cent Per capita 
Central tax revenue  72,266,200 60.52 1364 
Local tax revenue 47,136,300 39.48 889 
Total 119,402,500 100 2253 
Notes: The population was 53,000 at the end of 2003. 
Source: Respondent 24 
 
However, the actual division of tax revenue collected by M Township and 
divided between all different levels of government agencies during the whole 
year of 2003 shows the following distribution (for the whole year of 2003): 
 
Table 8: Actual Distribution of total tax revenue raised by M Township 
Level of Government Percentage share of total tax revenue 
collected by M Township 
Central government 40 
Provincial government 27 
Prefecture government 10 
District/County government 5 
M Township 18 
Source: Respondent 24 
  
The difference between the two sets of figures, in particular the small share that 
remains with the township government, is the result of different tax (fee) rates and  
tax refunds. These depend on the political leverage the township has in negotiating 
its tax contracts. 
 
(3) Individually negotiated shares of tax revenues and fees at the sub-provincial level 
contribute to the diversity in tax system that can be observed between and within 
provinces in China. The sharing formulas also contribute to the opacity of the tax 
system as the following example shows. In 2003 M Township had contracted to collect 
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120 million RMB in VAT and consumer tax on behalf of the SAT. The actually 
collected amount added up to 160 million, entitling the M Township to a bonus for the 
40 million in “excess” revenue. The bonus was calculated on the basis of a 
‘progressive’ rate: twelve per cent for up to twelve per cent of the excess revenue, 
fifteen per cent of the following 12 - 15 per cent of excess revenue and eighteen per 
cent for any excess beyond fifteen per cent. The total amount of bonus added up to 6 
million or fifteen per cent.  
 
As the interviews showed, each local tax, fee or surcharge is subject to different and 
changing sharing formulas. For example M Township could retain 38.8 per cent of the 
surcharges for education, 64 per cent of the land appreciation tax, 20 per cent of the 
urban and township land usage tax, and 100 per cent of the occupied farmland tax and 
surplus of urban maintenance and construction tax in 2003. The point to note here is 
that the province, prefecture or county can arbitrarily change ratios or even sharing 
rules by issuing an official document (hongtou wenjian). For instance, Suzhou 
prefecture in 2003 had increased the remittance ratio of total financial revenue of M 
township from 0.6 per cent in 2003 to 1.6 per cent in 2004. Whereas for the township 
this constitutes confiscation, for Suzhou prefecture it is part of the on-going negotation 
of tax volume in general. 
 
 (4) Tax refunds are not limited to intergovernmental transfers of tax revenues but 
include refunds to the tax payer on the basis of tax contracts between firms and local 
government agencies. Contrary to what statistics and official reports indicate, 
intergovernmental transfers do not only refer to the sharing of tax revenue with 
government agencies that are entitled by administrative norms or contracts. The tax 
system also knows re-transfers of tax revenue downwards, back to a range of tax 
payers, as the example of the bonus system showed. Aside from such bonuses, the 
local tax office and the local finance bureau offer re-transfers in the form of grants, 
awards, and subsidies. Remarkably, the township government as the main 
contracting party in tax contracts can offer informal refunds and other tax 
concessions to firms. Thus for example, L Township grants all firms established 
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since 2001 a three-year exemption from VAT, corporate income tax or business tax 
in form of a reimbursement from its own discretionary funds. Likewise, firms 
investing more than 10 million RMB in technological innovation also enjoy a 
three-years tax refund. These refunds show up in the expenditure side of the L 
Township (Appendix, Table 9) under mandated expenditure for education and 
infrastructure for 2003. The figure that interests us here is the expenditure on 
“industry and transportation”, which adds up to 38 million RMB or twenty per cent 
of the total. This item stands for tax refunds to firms and indicates the volume of 
discretionary funding the township governments enjoys within the seemingly formal 
and bureaucratised structure of the tax system. In fact, this example indicates that the 
local finance offices have to be included in the analysis of the tax system, as they 
administer most of the discretionary funding.  The fieldwork also reveals that tax 
refunds and price concessions for land are the main tools of townships in attracting 
outside investment and settlement of new firms. Townships prefer these 
discretionary and flexible incentives to formal subsidies which are subject to 
legislation,. Thus, L Township rather proudly reported that amongst the 83 firms 
established in 2003 within the township’s jurisdiction, forty had come from outside 
attracted by the advantageous business environment in L township. 
 
In such a system it cannot come as a surprise that townships turn to extrabudgetary or any 
other revenue source outside the formal control of the tax administration. In response,  the 
national government strives to harden the budget constraints for provincial and 
sub-provincial government agencies by expanding its formal reach , e.g. by revising 
sharing rules for  personal income tax or re-assigning certain tax revenue to higher level 
budgets3. Yet, each of these attempts, as the fieldworks proves, led to further searches for 
revenue generating opportunities. Thus, for example M Township does not rely on the 
sales of land only. It has established its own development corporation which developed 
industrial sites with buildings that are now rented out to private companies. Lease and rent 
income are regarded as a necessary additional and secure income source. 
 
To sum up, the system of tax contracting with firms on the one side and superior 
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government agencies on the other undercuts the intention to use a ‘detached’, 
Weberian-type bureaucracy for collecting, monitoring and enforcing tax legislation. The 
consequence is that at township level tax administration and tax policy cannot be 
separated. Despite all the technical formulae used within the tax sharing process, the 
budget procedure at the township level follows three rather straightforward steps. The 
township first estimates the total sum needed the mandatory tasks, operate the township 
government, and keep the agreed commitments to different groups of tax payer, basically 
firms. While non-monetary promises include complimentary investment in infrastructure 
and support in the lobbying effort for specific subsidies, monetary promises refer to 
favourable tax rates or other tax concessions. In a second step, the township negotiates with 
all other local government agencies the volume of tax revenue to be transferred and 
re-transferred. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that national taxes (guoshui) are no 
longer disputed but acknowledged as a hard constraint and therefore not part of the 
negotiation. The consecutive bargaining explains why the actual transfer of revenue from 
the township tax administration to the superior jurisdiction cannot be calculated in advance 
but shows only up at the end of the fiscal year. Yet the township knows from past 
experience the range of transfers and re-transfers. In case of an expected deficit it will 
therefore, in a third step, search for additional revenue sources outside the bureaucratic tax 
system (see Appendix, Figure 2). 
 
To overstate the case, the township is  not forced to adjust expenditure to revenue available, 
but adjusts revenue to expenditure planned and contracted. The system implies further that 
the more the central state attempts to harden the budget constraint the more will townships 
turn entrepreneurial, by embarking on business activities outside the reach of bureaucratic 
control. 
 
Findings 
 
The reach of the State 
 
As said at the beginning the decline of state revenues - the state's share of national income 
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- is only a weak indicator for economic transformation. The decline needs to be 
accompanied by a shift in revenue sources indicating a switch from an “ownership state” to 
a “tax state” (Campbell 1996: 45-84). Leaving aside the question of macroeconomic 
stability via money supply, what is expected is that taxation becomes the major revenue 
source. Revenue from the exploitation of state ‘owned’ or controlled resources needs to 
decline, as should revenue from ‘forced loans’ (Brean 2003: 30-34). 
 
To start with the latter, forced loans exist in China, yet cannot be verified via local budgets. 
Regardless of whether they take the form of deferred payments to agricultural producers, 
forced loans from banks for financing the working capital of state-owned firms or deferred 
salaries of teachers, all forced loans result from activities by government agencies at 
national or provincial level (Bahl 2003: 141).  
 
With respect to the declining share of revenue from state-owned resources, the two 
township budgets presented above point to a more complex picture. Even though the trend 
of EBRs to systematically outgrow tax revenue could be stopped and brought down to less 
than fifty per cent of total tax revenue (Eckaus, 2003, Table 1, 74), this did not result in the 
emergence of a tax state. In particular, land became the dominant resource in the hands of 
these local government agencies which came to rely on lease or sale of land to aliment their 
local budgets. In terms of economic transformation this development has its economic 
rationale, provided the revenues from land sales implicate a transfer of private property 
rights. As was shown above, the township more than the national budget give evidence of a 
privatisation of unprecedented scale and consequence in China’s history. Nevertheless, the 
reach of the (local) state will remain large and will only end in its present form when most 
land is in private hands. With respect to the emergence of a tax system, local control over 
land allows postponing reforms that would force local government agencies to offer public 
services on the basis of tax revenue alone.  So long as townships face ‘entrenched property 
rights’ over (valuable) land, they control a resource that directly translates into 
discretionary means for pursuing their own public and business interests. In the near future, 
it can thus not be expected that revenue from state controlled resources will disappear in 
local budgets.   
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Effective tax rates 
 
Effective tax rates in the Lucas (Lucas 1990) concept measure the total tax burden, i.e. tax 
base and tax rates adjusted by tax credit, exemptions and deductions which can cause 
different tax payers in different jurisdictions to pay different amount of taxes despite the 
same tax rate. Aside from the problem that in transition economies economic 
transformation needs to be accompanied by frequent changes in taxation, this concept 
cannot tackle the problem of dynamic institutional change caused by the interaction 
between the emerging private sector and local state authorities (Krug and Mehta 2004). 
While the models assume that the state is the only “innovator” when it comes to designing 
tax regimes, which moreover remain stable over a considerable time, the fieldwork in 
China points to another systematic factor. Here effective tax rates are composed of one 
defined formal part and one informal part negotiated on an annual base, often in the form of 
contracts between firms and local tax authorities.  
 
The fieldwork showed further that formal, national taxation was (no longer) disputed. The 
definition of the tax base and tax rates were accepted, and procedures established that 
ensured “detached” monitoring and enforcement. The revenue side of local budgets and tax 
legislation can however only partly explain the variance in after-tax income of firms (of 
otherwise equal performance). Our interviews with firms in the preceding years point to 
another indirect way of subsidization, not reflected in the local budget, and more related to 
local government’s control over local development corporations and other commercial 
ventures.  
 
As empirical studies in other transition economies have shown, in order to assess effective 
tax rates across localities, tax payments by firms need to be adjusted not only for subsidies 
(total amount and percentage of firms reporting subsidization), but also for tax arrears 
(total amount and percentage of firms reporting) plus soft loans, arrears of payments of 
loans, and “trade credit”, when firms agree to deferred payments (see also Kornai et. al. 
2003). To focus on local budgets is crucial, yet not sufficient. This requires the inclusion of 
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firms into the research agenda on emerging tax systems.  
 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
 
Our fieldwork illustrates that the present tax regime blurs the distinction between tax 
administration and tax policy at the township level because local government agencies 
vacillate between being a “subordinate” agent of the national tax system and being a rather 
independent lesser of tax contracts. Such a design generates a dilemma with respect to 
monitoring and incentives, the solution of which is attempted by the peculiar institution of 
intergovernmental transfers of tax revenue. Better monitoring, including improved 
auditing procedures, can increase tax collection per tax. It will, however, not change the 
ability of local government agencies to extract resources from the economic sector by the 
way of EBRs and off-budget revenues. On the other hand, the system of tax contracting has 
served Chinese economic development well. It offered enough incentives for local 
government agencies to implement tax reforms by making them claimant of residual tax 
revenue. The discretionary means local government agencies can generate in such a system 
were used for designing individual tax policy and led to a variety of different business 
systems that make fiscal federalism and jurisdictional competition (however limited) an 
economic reality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For a systematic analysis of China’s emerging tax regime, information from sub-provincial 
jurisdictions is crucial. Neither the diversity of business systems within China and within 
its provinces nor the progress of economic transformation can be explained unless 
townships as the resource owners and their local government agencies as the architects of 
tax policy are included in the analysis.  
 
A cautious interpretation of the empirical results points to two factors that play a role in the 
emergence of China’s tax regime which deserve further attention. One is that, indeed, 
transaction cost considerations play a role in deciding what and how to tax. VAT and the 
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Chinese form of corporate income tax were introduced because they were regarded as easy 
to enforce and to administer. Yet, the dominant factor for explaining the emergence of a tax 
regime is the allocation of property rights for resources and tax revenue.  Unlike all other 
transition economies, China’s economic reforms were accompanied by an entrenchment of 
property rights. There seems to be a broad consensus that townships, represented by their 
local government agencies, are the ‘legitimate’ owners of land.  Likewise, there seems also 
to be a consensus within the political arena that sub-provincial government agencies are the 
legitimate residual claimant of tax revenue. This at least is not contested by the central 
government.  
 
It is tempting to argue that this consensus reflects pre-20th century imperial Chinese 
tradition rather than a deliberate attempt to create new economic or political institutions. 
The devolution of power is subsequently less an attempt to introduce (fiscal) federalism 
than a politically expedient measure that enables aligning the interests of the legitimate 
local political agents with the reform policy as defined by the political centre. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Consolidated Financial Revenue: 1978-2002  
Year Central revenue (as percentage of total 
revenue) 
National revenue (as percentage of 
GDP) 
1978 15.5 31.2 
1980 24.5 25.7 
1985 38.4 22.4 
1986 36.7 20.8 
1987 33.5 18.4 
1988 32.9 15.8 
1989 30.9 15.8 
1990 33.8 15.8 
1991 29.8 14.6 
1992 28.1 13.1 
1993 22.0 12.6 
1994 55.7 11.2 
1995 52.2 10.7 
1996 49.4 10.9 
1997 48.9 11.6 
1998 49.5 12.6 
1999 51.1 13.9 
2000 52.2 15.0 
2001 52.4 16.8 
2002 55.0 18.0 
Note: National Revenue refers to the consolidated budgets of all government agencies. Domestic and foreign 
debts are excluded. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2003) 
 25
 
Table 2: Composition of National Tax Revenue, 2003 
Tax Items Per cent 
Indirect Taxes  
Value-added tax (VAT) 35.88 
Consumption tax 5.78 
Business tax 14.02 
Customs duties 13.63 
Direct Taxes  
Enterprise income tax 11.44 
Enterprise income tax on joint ventures and foreign companies 3.45 
Personal income tax 6.93 
Real estate tax 1.58 
Other Taxes 7.29 
Source: State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn  
 26
Table 3: Allocation of Tax Revenue, 1994-2000 
Classification Tax Item Central Shared Local 
Turnover Taxes Value-added tax (VAT)  X  
 Consumption tax X   
 Business tax   X a 
 Customs duties X   
Income Taxes Enterprise income tax   X  
 Enterprise income tax on joint ventures and 
foreign companies 
X   
 Individual income tax  X  
 Agricultural tax   X 
 Tax on special agricultural produce   X 
 Animal husbandry tax    X 
Resource Taxes Resource tax (other than off shore oil)   X 
 Urban and township land usage tax   X 
 Occupied farmland tax   X 
Property and 
Incentive Taxes 
Real estate tax (domestic)    X 
 Urban real estate tax (foreigners)   X 
 Land appreciation tax   X 
 Urban maintenance and construction tax     X 
 Stamp tax  X  
 Deed tax   X 
 Vehicle acquisition tax X   
 Vehicle and vessel usage license tax   X 
 Vehicle and vessel usage tax   X 
 Vessel tonnage tax   X 
 Slaughter tax (to be abolished)   X 
 Banquet tax (to be abolished)    X 
 Orientation adjustment tax on investment in 
fixed asset (to be abolished) 
  X 
Note: a Business taxes of enterprises subordinated to the Ministry of Railway, of headquarters of banks, and 
headquarters of insurance companies belong to central state while the rest belong to local state. 
Source: State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn  
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Table 4: Tax Collection by Authorities, since 1994 
Collection Authority Items 
State tax bureaus  Consumption tax, VAT, enterprises income tax a, 
enterprises income tax on joint ventures and foreign 
companies, stamp tax on security transaction, vehicle 
acquisition tax 
 
Local tax bureaus  Business tax, personal income tax b, resource tax, urban 
and township land usage tax, urban maintenance and 
construction tax, real estate tax, urban real estate tax, 
land appreciation tax, vehicle and vessel usage license 
tax, vehicle and vessel usage tax, slaughter tax, banquet 
tax, other stamp taxes 
 
Customs Customs duties, VAT in import and export, vessel 
tonnage tax 
 
MOF/LTBs Agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce, 
animal husbandry tax, deed tax, and occupied farmland 
tax. 
 
Notes: a For those enterprises established before 1 January 2002, the enterprise income tax is still collected by 
the local tax bureau; while the state tax bureau collects income tax of those companies established afterwards. 
b Personal income tax became central-local shared tax after 2002 but it is still collected by the local tax 
bureau. 
 
Sources: Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003); State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn  
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Table 5 Comparison Budget of M- and L-Township 
M township ‘original tax base’  L township ‘original tax base’
Budgetary revenue Income, output  Budgetary revenue Income, output 
Bonus remittance of taxes   Bonus remittance of taxes  
Fixed remittance of taxes   Fixed remittance of taxes  
Earmarked subsidy 
 
  Earmarked subsidy  
Extrabudgetary revenue   Budgetary fund revenue  
Surcharges to taxes for
education 
Income, output  Surcharges to taxes for rural 
education 
Income, output 
Fee for garbage collection user  Surcharges to taxes for 
education 
Income, output 
Fee for sewage disposal user  Earmarked fund revenue  
Fee for public security p.c., per firm  Profit of TVEs  
Fee for public utility user  Fee from administration 
agencies 
User, p.c. 
Water rates user  Water conservancy 
construction fund 
p.c., per firm 
Fee for family planning p.c.  Proceeds of 
education-assets-sale 
 
Banking interests   Other subsidy  
Other subsidy    Other revenue  
Proceeds of land-sale    Proceeds of land-sale  
Fee for land transaction   Fee for land transaction  
Other    Other  
Note: Not all fees are included in the local budgets, as most of user charges form revenues of those 
administrative units that provide the service (see Eckaus 2003, 78) 
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 
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Table 6: Composition of M and L Township Revenue, 2003 (per cent of total) 
Items M L 
Total financial revenue 100 100 
Budgetary revenue 45.23 24.40 
thereof   
Bonus remittance of taxes 31.90 18.20
Fixed remittance of taxes 12.78 4.58
Earmarked subsidy 
 
0.55 1.62
Extrabudgetary revenue 22.28 11.65 
thereof   
Surcharges to taxes for education 4.08 5.44
Fees charged by administration agencies 6.51 1.63
Other 
 
11.69 4.58
Other revenue 32.49 63.95 
thereof   
Proceeds of land-sale  26.99 44.58
Fees for land transaction 5.24 8.98
Profit of TVEs or governmental investments 0.03 9.85
Other 0.69 0.54
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 
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Table 9: Expenditure of L Township, 2003 
Items Amount (million RMB) Per cent 
Total financial expenditure 181 100 
Agriculture 4 2.5 
Industry and transportation  38 20.9 
Infrastructure  46 25.6 
Education  65 35.9 
Culture 8 4.5 
Health  3 1.9 
Social  4 2.4 
Administration 10 5.4 
Other  2 0.9 
Source: Respondent 26 
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Figure 1: Structure of Taxation Administration, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn  
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Figure 2:  Revenue and expenditure at the township level 
 
 
 
Revenue  
 
Statuary revenue 
 
Taxes 
Extrabudgetary 
revenue 
surcharges/fees 
Off-budgetary revenue 
Proceeds of land sale, profit 
from firms 
Expenditure  
 
 
Mandated 
expenditure 
 
Discretionary 
budget 
 
Soft constraint 
Hard constraint 
Upper jurisdiction 
 
 
Public 
expenditure 
Supporting local economic sector 
Tax refund/subsidy/investment in 
infrastructure 
 33
References 
 
Bahl, R. 1998. Central-Provincial-Local Fiscal Relations. The Revenue Side. In: Bean, 
D.J.S. (ed.). 1998. Taxation in Modern China. Routledge: New York and Londo: 
125-150. 
Bahl, R. and C. Wallich. 1992. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. World Bank. 
Country Economics Department Working Paper 863. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Bai, C., Y. Du, Z. Tao, and S. Tong. 2003. Local Protectionism and Regional 
Specialization: Evidence from China’s Industries. Ann Arbour, MI: William Davidson 
Working Paper 565. 
Bao, S., G.H. Chang, J. Sachs and W.T. Woo. 2002. Geographic Factors and China’s 
Regional Development Under Market Reform, 1978-1998, China Economic Review 
13:89-111. 
Bean, D.J.S. (ed.). 1998a. Taxation in Modern China. Routledge: New York and London 
Bean, D.J.S. 1998b. Fiscal Reform in Modern China. In: Bean, D.J.S. (ed.). 1998. Taxation 
in Modern China. Routledge: New York and London: 3-30. 
Berkowitz, D. and W. L. 2000. Tax Rights in transition Economies: A Tragedy of the 
Commons, Journal of Public Economics 76: 369-97. 
Bernstein, T.P. and X. Lü. 2003. Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural 
China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Blanchard, O. and A. Shleifer. 2000. Federalism With and Without Centralization: China 
versus Russia, NBER working Paper w 7616.Washington, DC: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Brandt, L., S. Rozelle and M.A. Turner. 2002. Local Government Behaviour, Bureaucratic 
Incentives, and Tenure Security in Rural China, Department of Economics, University 
of Toronto, Working Paper, mturner-02-01. 
Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of 
Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Cai, Y.S. 2003. Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of 
Farmland in China. Copy. China Quarterly 175: 662-680. 
Campbell, John. 1996, An Institutional Analysis of Fiscal Reform in Postcommunist 
 34
Europe, Theory and Society 25: 45-84. 
Cao, Y. Z., Y. Y. Qian, and B. R. Weingast. 1999, From Federalism, Chinese Style, to 
Privatisation, Chinese Style, Economics of Transition 7: 103-131. 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF). 2003. 
Taxation laws, Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe. 
Chen, H. and S. Rozelle. 1999, Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of Township and 
Village Enterprises in China, Journal of Development Economics 60: 529-557. 
China Statistical Yearbook 2003, Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
Chung, J. H. 2001. Vertical Support, Horizontal Linkages, and Regional Disparities in 
China: Typology, Incentive Structure, and Operational Logic. Issues and Studies 37,4: 
121-148.  
Chung, Jae Ho. 1995, Studies of Central-provincial Relations in People’s Republic of 
China: A Mid-term Appraisal, China Quarterly 142: 487-580. 
Eckaus,R. 2003. Some Consequences of fiscal reliance on extrabudgetary revenues in 
China. China Economic Review 14: 72-88. 
Frye, T. and A. Shleifer. 1997, The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand, American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87, 2: 354-358. 
Goodman, D. S. G. 2000. The Localism of Local Leadership: Cadres in Reform Shanxi, 
Journal of Contemporary China 9: 159-183. 
Gordon, H. and D.D. Li. 1997. Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. 
China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Business School. William Davidson Institute 
Working Paper No. 56. 
Gordon, R.H. and W. Li. 1999. Government as a Discriminating Monopolist in the 
Financial Market: The Case of China, Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 7110. 
Heady, C. and S.Y. Bin. 1998. Marginal Effective Tax Rates in the Reformed Tax System. 
In: Bean, D.J.S. (ed.). 1998. Taxation in Modern China. Routledge: New York and 
London: 69-92. 
Hellman, J.S. and M. Schankerman. 2000, Intervention, Corruption and Capture, 
Economics of Transition 8, 3: 545-576. 
Hendrischke, H. 2003. How local are local enterprises? Privatization and translocality of 
 35
small firms in Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Provincial China 7: 27-39. 
Holzer; M. and M. Zhang. 2004. China’s Fiscal Reform: The Issue of Extra-budgeting. 
Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 16,1: 19-39. 
Hsu, S. P. 2000a. Local Tax Effort in Shanghai, 1987-93: Decentralization vs. Local Fiscal 
Balance. Issues and Studies 36,6: 116-138. 
Hsu, S. P. 2004. Deconstructing Decentralization in China: fiscal incentive versus local 
autonomy in policy implementation. Journal of Contemporary China 13,40: 567-599. 
Hsu, S.C. 1999. Two Local Regime Types in China’s Rural Industrialization: A 
Comparative Study of Four Townships in Fujian and Jiangsu, Issues & Studies 35, 1: 
80-130. 
Hsu, S.P. 2000b. Central-Local Relations in the PRC under the Tax Assignment System: 
An Empirical Evaluation, 1994-97. Issues and Studies 36,2: 32-72. 
Inman, R. and D. Rubinfeld. 1998, Rethinking Federalism, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11, 4: 43-64. 
International Monetary Fund 1994. Economic Reform in China: A New Phase. Occasional 
Papper 114. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kiser, E. 1994. Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal Agent 
Analysis. Politics and Society 22, 3: 284-315. 
Kornai, J., E. Maskin and G. Roland. 2003. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, Journal of 
Economic Literature XLI:1095-1136. 
Krug, B. and H. Hendrischke. 2003, China Incorporated: Property Rights, Privatisation, 
and the Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China, Managerial Finance 29, 12: 
32-45.  
Krug, B. and Z. Zhu. 2004. Is China a Leviathan?, ERIM Report Series Research in 
Management, ERS-2004-103-ORG,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1821. 
Lee, P. K. 2000. Into the trap of Strengthening State Capacity: China’s Tax Assignment 
Reform. The China Quarterly 164: 1007-1024. 
Levi, M. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley, CA: University of California. 
Litwack, J. 2003. Central Control of Regional budgets: Theory with Applications to Russia, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming.  
Ma, J. 1995. Macroeconomic Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Policy 
 36
Research Working Paper 1408, The World Bank, Washington DC.  
Ma, J. 1995. Modelling Central-local Fiscal Relations in China, China Economic Review 6, 
1:105-136.  
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and R. McNab. 1997. Tax Systems in Transition Economies. 
Georgia State University, Andrew School of Policy Studies, Working paper 97-1. 
Montinola, Y.Y. Qian and B.R. Weingast. 1995, Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political 
Basis for Economic Success in China, World Politics 4, 1: 50-81. 
Mueller, D. C. 1989. Public Choice II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mueller, D. C. and P. Murrell. 1985, Interest Groups and the Political Economy of 
Government Size, In: Forte, F. and A. Peacock (eds.), Public Expenditure and 
Government Growth, Oxford: Blackwell, 13 –36.  
Mui, M. and I. Jia. 2002. China Reforms for the World Stage, International Tax Review, 1 
March 2002. 
Nee, V. 2000. The role of the state in making a market economy, Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 156: 66-88. 
North, D.C. 1984. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 7-17.  
Oates, W.E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Oi, J.C. 1992. Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in 
China, World Politics, 45, 1: 99 – 126. 
Oi, J.C. 1995. The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy, China 
Quarterly 144:1132-1149. 
Oksenberg, M. and J. Tong. 1991. The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in 
China, 1971-1984: The Formal System, China Quarterly 125:1-32.  
Park, A., S. Rozelle, C. Wong and C. Ren. 1996. Distributional Consequences of 
Reforming Local Public Finance in China, China Quarterly 147: 751-78.  
Qian, Y. Y. and B.R. Weingast. 1997. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market 
Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: 83-92. 
Qian, Y. Y. and G. Roland. 1998. Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, American 
Economic Review 84: 1143-1162. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1994. Politicians and firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
 37
109: 995-1025. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1998. The Grabbing Hand, Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
University Press. 
Smyth, R. and B. Inder. 2004. Is Chinese Provincial Real GDP Per Capita Nonstationary? 
Evidence from Multiple Trend Break Unit Root Tests, China Economic Review 15: 
1-24. 
State Administration of Taxation, PRC. 2003. www.chinatax.gov.cn 
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1990. Information and Organization, Berkeley, CA: University of 
California.  
Tsang, S. and Y. Cheng. 1994. China’s Tax Reforms of 1994: Breakthrough or 
Compromise? Asian Survey 34, 9:769-88. 
Tsui, K. and Y. Wang. 2004. Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal 
Decentralization in China, China Quarterly 177: 71-91. 
Tung, C.Y. 2003. China’s Fiscal Predicament. American Asian Review 21,1: 25-53. 
Unger, J. and A. Chan. 1995. China, Corporatism, and the East –Asian Model, The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33: 29-53. 
Walder, A.G. 1995. Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis 
of China’s Transitional Economy, American Journal of Sociology 101, 2: 263-301. 
Wank, D. L. 1999. Producing Property Rights: Strategies, Networks, and Efficiency in 
Urban China’s Nonstate Firms. In: J.C. Oi, and A.G. Walder (eds.). Property rights and 
Economic Reform in China, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 264-267. 
Wank, D.L. 1996. The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private 
Business in a South China City, China Quarterly 3:820-838. 
Wedeman, A. 2003. From Mao to Market: Rent-Seeking, Local Protectionism, and 
Marketization in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wei, Y. D. 2000. Fiscal Reforms, Investment, and Regionalism. Development in Jiangsu 
Province. Issues and Studies 36,2: 73-98.  
West, L. A. and C.P. Wong. 1995. Fiscal Decentralisation and Growing Regional 
Disparities in Rural China: Some Evidence in the Provision of Social Services. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 11,4: 70-84. 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, London: 
 38
Macmillan. 
Winer, St. and W. Hettich. 2003. The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and  
Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters, Carleton University, Economy 
Working Paper No. 02-11. http://ssrn.com/abstract=388001 
Wong, C. P. (eds.). 1997. Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China, 
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.  
Wong, C. P. 1991. Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of 
Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China, China Quarterly 128: 691-715.  
Wong, C.P. 1992. Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic Sequencing 
of Reform in Post-Mao China, Modern China 18, 2: 197-227. 
Wong, C.P. 2002. China National Development and Sub-national Finance: A Review of 
Provincial Expenditures, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Wong, C.P., C. Heady and W.T. Woo. 1995. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in 
the People’s Republic of China. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
World Bank. 1994. China: Country Economic Memorandum, Macroeconomic Stability in 
a Decentralised Economy, Washington, DC: World Bank 
Yep, R. 2004. Can ‘Tax-for-fee’ Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, 
Progress and Limitations, China Quarterly, 177: 42-71. 
 
                                                 
1 The formula for the three basic taxes looks at follows:  
 Central Local 
VAT 75% 25% 
Enterprise Income Tax a 50% (2002), 60% (2003) 50% (2002), 40% (2003) 
Personal income tax b 50% (2002), 60 % (2003) 50% (2002), 40% (2003)  
Notes: a Enterprise income taxes on Firms subordinate to the Ministry of Railway, headquarters of banks, and 
headquarters of maritime and petrol companies transfer their income taxes to the central only. b Before 2002 
all Personal income tax was local. 
Source: Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003) 
2 See the Circular of the State Council “On issues concerning establishing vertical led tax branches of SAT 
and local tax bureaus”, 16 November 1993). 
3 See for example the Circulars of the State Council “concerning enforcement of taxation administration and 
restrict control of taxation rebate and exemption”, (23 July 1993); “concerning legal enforcement of taxation 
administration and restricting taxation authority”, (12 March 1998); and “concerning redressing local 
government’s tax refund policy”, (11 January 2000). 
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